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Drones, Risk, and Perpetual Force
Christian Enemark
How should we conceptualize the use of missile-equipped uninhabitedaerial vehicles (UAVs or “drones”) in the U.S. “war on terror”? If vio-lence of this kind is to be effectively restrained it is necessary ﬁrst to
establish an understanding of its nature. To this end, it is useful to focus on
those theatres of the war where drones are the dominant platform for violence
(such as in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia), rather than where they support pri-
marily ground-based efforts (such as in Afghanistan and Iraq). The analysis in
this article is presented in two parts. The ﬁrst part considers whether drone strikes
are better conceptualized as acts of war or of law enforcement. If it is difﬁcult to
conceptualize drone-based violence as acts of war, then such violence may not be
captured by the traditional jus ad bellum (just resort to war) framework within
just war theory. And if drone strikes do not constitute a law enforcement practice,
the peacetime ethics of criminal justice may not apply either. One possible solu-
tion is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim (just resort
to force) in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon the
sustainability of a vim/bellum distinction.
The second part of the article suggests a fourth alternative concept of drone-
based violence—vis perpetua (perpetual force)—and explores the ethical implica-
tions thereof. At the strategic level, drone strikes pose a moral problem if, as a
form of risk management, they are intended to continue indeﬁnitely. At the indi-
vidual level, the lack of physical risk experienced by drone operators serves to
relieve domestic political concerns about casualties among U.S. combatants.
However, a corollary of so reducing the “friction” that counteracts perpetual
force is that physical risk is effectively transferred away from U.S. combatants
and toward foreign noncombatants living in the places where drone strikes
occur. The injustice of such systematic endangerment of innocents is compounded
by the possibility that drone-based violence carries no promise of victory and,
thereafter, peace.
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The Nature of Drone-Based Violence
The drone strikes that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly car-
ries out have occurred mostly inside Pakistan. Unofﬁcial sources indicate that,
using uninhabited Predator and Reaper aircraft, the CIA has prosecuted more
than  strikes there since . Drone strikes against individuals identiﬁed
as terrorists are also reportedly underway in Yemen and Somalia, but on a
much smaller scale. When a drone is ﬂying over a particular location within
the territory of one of these states, the aircraft and its onboard weapons are con-
trolled via satellite by a U.S. agent seated in a control station thousands of miles
away. Assisted by an analyst sitting immediately adjacent, the drone operator uses
a keyboard and a joystick-like steering device while monitoring screens that dis-
play live video feed, a navigation map, and technical data on the drone. The
agent’s act of killing—pressing a button that causes a munition to detach from
the drone’s wing and ﬂy to a target beneath it—thus takes place in the absence
of any physical risk to that agent or any U.S. personnel.
For the purpose of informing ethical analysis of this set of actions and circum-
stances, an important question is: do drone strikes count as war? Every military
organization and every individual military professional understandably prefers
to ﬁght in a way that involves a maximum of risk to the enemy and a minimum
of risk to one’s own side. To be able to kill from a great distance is, as Shane
Riza describes it, “The Oldest Dream of the Second-Oldest Profession.”
Accordingly, numerous lethal technologies have been introduced that, by avoiding
hand-to-hand combat, reduce the physical risk experienced by their user: the
slingshot, the longbow, the riﬂe, the submarine, and so on. However, when a
mode of killing is risk-free to the individual killer, it is worth asking whether
“war” is going on at all. This is a critical question because of the relationship be-
tween violence and ethics. War is a state of affairs, but “war” is also a political term
of art that potentially bestows legitimacy upon some forms of violence. Ethics is
thus constitutive of the practice of war as a form of violence that is morally dis-
tinguishable from other forms—for example, from violence carried out for law
enforcement or murderous purposes. Although the character of war—how, by
whom, and for what purpose it is waged—can and does change, the nature of
war is immutable: war, to be war, must be a contest. In the nineteenth century,
the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz wrote that it is “the element of the
thing itself” that “war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale,” and he likened
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it to a match between “two wrestlers,” each of whom “strives by physical force to
compel the other to submit to his will.” Perfect symmetry (as in a wrestling match
or a game of chess) never occurs in war, and just war thinking has never required
war to be a fair or evenly balanced ﬁght, but it does require that a ﬁght of some
sort is going on.
Fundamentally, according to Clausewitz, “War is always the shock of two hos-
tile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass,
because an absolute state of endurance would not be making war.” Arguably, the
U.S. government places drone operators in such a state by having them apply force
in a radically asymmetric fashion. If so, drone technology is better conceived as
not merely transforming the character of war (as so many other technologies
have done in the past) but rather as enabling a form of violence so fundamentally
different in nature that it is difﬁcult to conceive of as war. Whereas the mutual
experience of physical risk is elemental to any violent contest, a one-sided expe-
rience of risk resembles merely (to use Clausewitz’s words) “the action of a living
power upon an inanimate mass.”
It is important to acknowledge that, in the broadest sense, drone-based violence
is not entirely uncontested and thus not absolutely risk-free for the United States.
American civilians, for example, could be targeted by terrorist enemies who are
enraged by drone strikes, and it is possible to imagine any number of ways in
which diverse U.S. interests globally could be harmed by someone striving some-
how to ﬁght back. For this reason, and for present purposes, it is sufﬁcient to test
the limits of the concept of war by reference only to the condition of those who
directly perpetrate or suffer violence. My focus, in other words, is on the experi-
ence of physical risk when and where killing and dying happens.
Following the  NATO intervention in Kosovo, during which U.S. and allied
casualties were avoided by high-altitude bombing, Michael Ignatieff contrasted
“war” with what he regarded as “a turkey shoot” in the Balkans. Paul Kahn, re-
ferring to the same set of circumstances, observed that “without the imposition of
mutual risk, warfare is not war at all.” In his view, combat establishes “a relation-
ship of reciprocal risk” in which killing is “linked to a willingness to be killed.”
This would indeed be the case if, following Clausewitz’s analogy, two individual
“wrestlers” were willingly engaged in a ﬁght to the death. But whereas Kahn ap-
pears to focus on the individual combatant (who kills or is killed), Clausewitz was
referring to the metaphorical “wrestling” that is collectively engaged in by an en-
tire army. Some modern-day scholars insist that when discussing the use of drones
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“the relevant threat” is that which exists “at the level of armed forces considered as
a whole,” rather than between individual combatants. However, the image of
armed forces arrayed against each other is not generally apposite in the war on
terror. Nor does it accommodate speciﬁcally the highly individualized character
of drone-based violence whereby, strike by strike, one individual places another
in the crosshairs, and so America’s enemies are dispatched one by one. For the
purposes of this article, therefore, a focus on individuals’ experience of risk at ei-
ther end of a drone strike is at the very heart of the matter. Projecting strategic
power in a way that avoids physical risk to individual users of force is the raison
d’etre of this mode of remote-control killing.
When contemplating modern-day violence using advanced military technolo-
gies, it is perhaps too much to require, as Kahn does, that the only morally rele-
vant source of physical risk is the reciprocated threat of an opposing combatant.
But in order that violence of any kind may plausibly be conceptualized as war, it is
surely a minimum requirement that a would-be killer experiences some risk that is
intrinsic (and not merely incidental) to the process of killing. In certain circum-
stances, the sheer dangerousness of a situation would be enough. For example, a
submariner deep underwater who ﬁres a torpedo or a pilot high in the air who
drops a bomb can expose others to violence without fear of reciprocation, but
the very participation in such activities imposes signiﬁcant risks. By contrast,
ground-based drone operators deep inside U.S. territory are exposed neither to
the violence of others nor to an inherently dangerous environment, and this is
hard to reconcile with the traditional expectation that warfare is a contested activ-
ity. In a  article, Michael Walzer argued that “the easiness” of killing by drone
“should make us uneasy.” Drones are “a dangerously tempting technology,” as
they “[make] our enemies more vulnerable than ever before, and we can get at
them without any risk to our own soldiers.”
Related to Walzer’s last point, Tony Coady has argued that “in the conceptual
and moral analysis of war . . . the target’s incapacity to ﬁght back [should not]
absolve the attacker of the need to justify the attack by the moral standards appro-
priate to war.” However, it seems both unreasonable and futile to insist upon the
application of just war rules to that which, in Clausewitzian terms at least, is a
nonwar. If, instead of war, drone strikes resemble “a godlike power to call
down destruction from the skies,” the rules for restraining such strikes would
need to be derived from a different concept of violence.
368 Christian Enemark
One alternative might be to conceptualize drone-based violence as law
enforcement. In that paradigm, a radical imbalance of lethal power is sometimes
legitimate. Circumstances of “insurmountable tactical asymmetry” present no
problem, as Kahn argues, provided that the “ethos of policing” (rather than the
ethos of warfare) applies: “The criminal has no right to use force against those
seeking to enforce the law.” Similarly, when judicially-authorized capital punish-
ment is carried out, the moral inequality between the person killing and the per-
son killed permits the former to use force without experiencing physical risk.
Are drone operators thus better likened to police ofﬁcers or executioners than to
warriors? Since the war on terror began, the language of the U.S. government has
often contained mixed messages regarding the moral status of America’s use of
force, with the result that it has variously taken on the appearance of war, law en-
forcement, or some exotic mixture of the two. Although there may be political ad-
vantage to be derived from attempting to straddle the war and law enforcement
paradigms, the ethical principles that apply within one are incompatible with
those in the other, and the likelihood is that neither paradigm can maintain
moral purchase on drone-based violence. For just as it is difﬁcult to conceptualize
the use of armed drones against individual terrorists as “war,” the portrayal of
such violence as the stuff of “crime and punishment” is for at least three reasons
even less plausible.
First and most obviously, there is a fundamental problem with the idea of
enforcing (as against an individual) a criminal law in the international realm.
Sovereign states with a monopoly on violence inside their territory may violently
enforce law there because their authority to do so is established. This is less clearly
the case when one state purports to engage in law enforcement on an extraterri-
torial basis, although international war-crimes tribunals are a rare example of how
this can legitimately occur. Even if the domestic/international distinction is set
aside, a second problem is that the United States, as the (would-be) victim of a
terrorist attack as well as the judge and executioner, does not have the impartiality
that is usually required of those who work in a system of criminal justice. Third,
drone-based violence necessarily bypasses processes and responsibilities that are
essential to the law enforcement paradigm. If, pursuant to that paradigm, state ac-
tion against terrorists is based on the notion of criminal culpability (as distinct
from dangerousness in war), such framing triggers the application of peacetime
human rights norms, including the right to a fair trial and protection against
the arbitrary taking of life. The dangerousness of a violent criminal—on a
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rampage and resisting arrest—may justify suspending the requirement of arrest
(preceding trial and possible punishment), but this is so only when the use of le-
thal force is necessary to protect law ofﬁcials and/or innocent bystanders. By
contrast, in the way a U.S. drone strike is carried out in, say, Pakistan, the killing
done is preventive rather than reactive, and without the immediate need for a
drone operator to defend himself or others. More generally, whereas (lethal) pun-
ishment ought always to be an end-point in a process of law enforcement, killing is
at once the foremost and ultimate rationale of a drone strike.
If it is difﬁcult to conceptualize drone strikes as law enforcement, and if they do
not constitute war (qua war-as-contest), we are left with the problem of lacking a
conceptual basis for restraining the resort to this unfamiliar form of violence.
There might be some advantage, therefore, in conceiving of such strikes as some-
thing “between” law enforcement and war, and accordingly to considering the
suggestion by some scholars that the development of a jus ad vim (just resort
to force) framework could serve to ﬁll the ethical vacuum. Such a solution
would involve equating drone-based violence with the concept of vim and,
prior to that, establishing vim as possessing a distinct meaning that is sustainable
in practice.
In a previous issue of this journal, Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun called
for a jus ad vim framework to be developed that could capture modern forms of
violent action that do not ﬁt within the rubric of jus ad bellum. In seeking to
distinguish “war” and “force short of war” for ethical purposes, the authors ad-
dress the genuine concern that violence in world affairs is sometimes ungoverned
and that unjust harm can sometimes be inﬂicted with impunity. If the nature of a
drone strike, for example, is such that it is something other than or short of “war,”
does it escape judgment according to principles of justice applicable only to war?
Brunstetter and Braun emphasize “the important distinction between force short
of war and war,” and they describe the ethical contexts raised by the former as
“unique.” Indeed, only by drawing a clear distinction between these two
forms of violence can jus ad vim have any meaning and purpose.
From the outset, however, this is made difﬁcult at the conceptual level because
Brunstetter and Braun deﬁne vim negatively—that is, as the absence of war.
Logically, the knowledge of what something isn’t does not nearly equate to under-
standing what it is. Thus, to deﬁne vim as force “short of war” is to be cryptic
about the precise nature of such force. One is left wondering what the essence
of the thing is, and the deﬁnitional void is only partially and contingently ﬁlled
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by dealing in examples. This is unsatisfactory if “force short of war” in some way
involves actual violence that harms people and damages property; the prevention
or mitigation thereof is not well served by an understanding only that that force is
not war. Indeed, when bodies are bleeding and buildings are exploding, a negative
deﬁnition would seem to be unhelpful and, in an immediate sense at least, implau-
sible. One actor’s vim could readily be conceived as another’s bellum.
Because the vim/bellum distinction is in practice so often hard to discern, the
tendency of some scholars is instead to fall back on a specious small/large distinc-
tion. It becomes, then, a distinction of degree rather than kind. The focus is on the
quantum rather than the nature of violence, with large (or larger) amounts vague-
ly associated with “war.” Steven Lee, for example, deﬁnes war as “large-scale armed
conﬂict between states or other large organized groups,” and for Coady war is
“the resort by an organized group to a relatively large-scale act of violence for po-
litical purposes to compel an enemy to do the group’s will.” Similarly focused on
scale, Brian Orend argues that “the onset of war requires a conscious commitment
and a signiﬁcant mobilization on the part of the belligerents in question. There’s
no real war so to speak until the ﬁghters intend to go to war and until they do so
with a heavy quantum of force.” These authors’ ideas provide ample precedent
for Brunstetter and Braun to adopt the same approach in advocating the develop-
ment of a jus ad vim framework, referring as they do to “the large quantum of
force associated with war” and the “widespread destructive consequences of
war.” Throughout their article, the term “war” is routinely preceded by such
qualiﬁers as “widespread,” “large-scale,” “full-scale,” and “full-blown.” However,
by discussing war only in this way, the distinction being drawn is really between
“large-scale war” and “war-short-of-large-scale-war” rather than between “war”
and “force-short-of-war.” The trouble with the former distinction is that it is high-
ly vulnerable to arbitrariness and contestation in the delineation between “small”
and “large.” Most obviously, a war that seems small-scale to the stronger side may
seem large-scale to the weaker side. A small/large distinction is thus too fragile a
basis for jus ad vim to stand as a credible moral framework accessible to all
would-be users of force. For vim to be meaningfully distinct from bellum, such
that jus ad vim can have practical purchase as a moral framework when jus ad
bellum cannot, there has to be more to the story than quantum of force alone.
If, by this process of reasoning, drone strikes cannot be rendered governable by
conceptualizing them as vim, the ethical problem of impunity remains. Beyond
the conceptual realms of war, law enforcement, and vim, a governance solution
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other than outright prohibition might one day be found. For now, however, I aim
to introduce an alternative conceptualization of drone strikes, one that envisages
yet more potential for injustice without remedy: the idea of such strikes as a kind
of vis perpetua (perpetual force). I argue that the immorality of drone-based vio-
lence is attributable to its status as an exercise in risk management. The chosen
means of violence involves the deliberate and systematic transfer of military risk
away from U.S. combatants and toward foreign noncombatants, and the potential
therein for injustice is compounded by the pursuit of a strategic end that is inten-
tionally not time limited.
Justice and Perpetual Force
When the U.S. government uses drone strikes and other violent methods to
engage its terrorist enemies on a global scale, its narrative is one of war: a war
on terror. As discussed in the ﬁrst part of this article, such framing purportedly
enables the United States to avail itself of the special moral permissions that are
traditionally afforded to war ﬁghters. In addition, however, the notion of war
necessarily implies the notion of peace as a state of affairs that follows victory
(by one side over the other) or a political settlement that otherwise brings violence
to an end. At the conceptual level, just as war is by nature a contest, so too is it
something that exists in opposition to peace; the existence of one is veriﬁed by
reference to the other. The ethical signiﬁcance of this traditional dichotomy lies
in the promise that war, and all the misery that attends it, is temporary. War is
instrumental to achieving a just peace but is not an end in itself; there must be,
one could say, a time for war and a time for peace.
Violence of a kind that is intended to be used unendingly is therefore difﬁcult,
for ethical purposes, to conceptualize as war. But that is not to say that all such
violence is necessarily illegitimate. For example, if one accepts that the problem
of criminality within a given society cannot be eradicated but only controlled,
the occasional yet repeated resort to violence by police ofﬁcers and executioners
is legitimized by the perceived need to “manage” crime on an ongoing basis.
Critically, and only in a peacetime context, this open-ended commitment is tem-
pered by strict limitations on the use of violence for law enforcement purposes.
The problem of terrorism, by contrast, is difﬁcult politically to categorize as
“crime,” and the idea of (merely) “managing” it has at times been controversial.
Arguably, however, U.S. counterterrorism efforts (including CIA drone strikes)
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have been conducted according to a logic of risk management—one that deliber-
ately ignores limits of space and time. And although the idea of war is evoked dur-
ing such efforts, the war/peace dichotomy is denied in practice, and this
inconsistency carries the potential for injustice.
In September  the U.S. Congress authorized the use of “all necessary and
appropriate force” in order to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United
States. Two salient features of the  Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) are, ﬁrst, that it grants the U.S. president sweeping power to determine
who counts as an enemy and, second, that it does not impose geographical
limitations of any kind. Accordingly, drone strikes have been conducted against
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also against individuals identiﬁed as
terrorists in countries where the United States is not at war: in Pakistan,
Somalia, and Yemen.
In a move also consistent with the AUMF, recent U.S. presidents have exercised
their power to loosen certain limitations on the use of force. In , as part of a
dramatic expansion of the Pakistan drone campaign, the CIA was reportedly au-
thorized to attack not only high-value individuals whose names are on an ap-
proved list (so-called “personality strikes”) but also suspected militants of lower
value whose identities have not been conﬁrmed. This expanded authority,
granted by President George W. Bush and maintained by President Barack
Obama, permits the CIA to rely on “pattern-of-life” analysis using information
about individuals and locations collected by cameras mounted on drones
and from other sources. In the words of one senior U.S. ofﬁcial (speaking anon-
ymously): “We might not always have their names but . . . these are people whose
actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat.” As a further ex-
ample of the increasing reliance on only circumstantial evidence in determining
targets, it was reported in  that President Obama had embraced a method
of counting casualties that “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike
zone as combatants . . . unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving
them innocent.”
The transcending of identity- and geography-based limitations on the use
of force in combating terror has clearly been facilitated by drone technology.
However, as the U.S. government carries out its plans to increase the scale and
intensity of its drone use, the issue likely to come to the fore is that of temporal
limitation: for how long is this form of violence intended to continue? From an
ethical perspective, this is a vital question. As the death and destruction resulting
drones, risk, and perpetual force 373
from violence are prima facie wrongs, they can begin to be legitimized by trading
them away only temporarily in the expectation that the promise of a better peace
will thereby be fulﬁlled. By contrast, the intentional waging of an endless cam-
paign of violence using drones would be an ethical impossibility: a kind of perma-
nent or perpetual force (vis perpetua), indeﬁnitely subordinating right to might. In
the study of physics, “perpetual motion” describes motion that continues indeﬁ-
nitely without any external source of energy, and it is held to be impossible in
practice because of friction and other sources of energy loss. Likewise, for the pur-
poses of this article, vis perpetua is not a label to describe the permanent applica-
tion of force as a matter of fact. Force originally described in this way could, due to
internal and/or external factors (“friction”), later slow to a halt or be brought to an
abrupt end. Rather, the morally signiﬁcant factor to which the term vis perpetua
refers is an actor’s intent to sustain (perpetuate) the use of force in a way that is
temporally unlimited.
Initially, under the presidency of George W. Bush, the potential for a war-
on-terror-without-end was mostly bound up in the idea that America was engaged
in a contest between good and evil. In the week following /, for example, Bush
declared: “I have faith in our military. And we have got a job to do . . . we will rid
the world of evil doers.” Such powerful rhetoric served the immediate purpose of
reassuring and motivating a demoralized citizenry, but in reality the “job” of de-
feating evil is in practice so boundless a task as to be an impossible one. However,
Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, took care to explain his country’s participation
in the war on terror in less ambitious terms. In May , amid mounting political
pressure to detail and justify his government’s not-so-secret drone campaigns in
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, Obama delivered a major speech asserting that:
We must deﬁne the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will deﬁne us. We have
to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom
in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total
defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human
beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society.
By so abandoning his predecessor’s ambition to “rid the world of evil doers,”
Obama purported to address domestic concerns about “a perpetual war on
terror.” As the president continued, he outlined his intentions
to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force . . . to deter-
mine how we can continue to ﬁght terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual
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wartime footing. . . . Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must
continue. But this war, like all wars, must end.
Here the president was employing simultaneously the language of termination
and continuation. A counterterrorism adviser to President Bush later told the
New York Times: “This is both a promise to an end to the war on terror, while
being a further declaration of war, constrained and proportional in its scope.”
Thus, in the U.S. government’s “systemic effort” to “continue” targeting terror-
ists—albeit not in the manner of Madison’s “continual warfare”—the potential
for vis perpetua remains.
In large measure, this potential is a function of the powerful and enduring
temptation to violence offered by drone technology. Political friction—in the
form of domestic concern about strategic objectives and friendly casualties—can
hinder or halt a state’s enterprise of political violence. By contrast, in the case
of the U.S. drone program, such friction is largely avoided by pursuing an objec-
tive (management) that is sustainably modest and by using a method (remote-
control killing) that exposes U.S. personnel to no physical risk. This is the “easi-
ness” (the source of Walzer’s moral unease) that provides a foundation for in-
tentional open-endedness in the application of force.
In the context of the war on terror, conceptualizing drone-based violence in this
way is plausible because it appears to be a deliberate and indeﬁnite exercise in the
management of terrorist risks. Christopher Coker, for example, has described “the
concept of a ‘long’ or ‘never-ending war’” as “an astrategic, tactically driven risk
management policy which locks the West into an endless process of risk manage-
ment.” In contrast to the Long Peace in Europe in the nineteenth century, which
resulted from states’ collective maintenance of a stable balance of power, the (long)
war on terror is about managing nonstate challenges to a preponderance of U.S.
power. But if, as another author suggests, the “negative, if not dystopian” outlook
of riskmanagement is that “risks can only bemanaged, not completely eradicated,”
this presents an ethical problem if the chosenmethod is a violent one. Peace (follow-
ing the ending of that violence) would be neither promised nor in prospect, because
“success” would be measured only by reference to the length of uninterrupted se-
quences of nonevents—that is, foiled or failed terrorist attacks.
Even if it is not possible to conceptualize drone strikes as war, law enforcement,
or vim, this does not avoid the general proposition that violence of every kind
should be subject to some form of limitation. And, at a minimum, based on
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the unassailable assumption that violence is not always going to be a good thing,
the most straightforward limitation is a temporal one. At issue is not whether the
violence being contemplated will ever end as a matter of fact (for that is unknow-
able). Rather, it is a matter of intention: the would-be user of force should not be
permitted to intend their violent enterprise to be a permanent one. Commitment
to a precise time limit is neither practical nor necessary; all that is required is that
the eventual termination of violence be both conceivable and desired. If, however,
the drone-based violence carried out by the U.S. government is or becomes bound
up in the process-oriented logic of risk management, there is a danger that it will
fail to satisfy even this most basic requirement of limitation. As a violent enter-
prise of intentionally indeﬁnite duration, the drone program would constitute
vis perpetua and thus be ethically untenable. It is unfortunate, therefore, that
the political temptation to perpetuate a drone-based approach to risk-managing
terrorism does not and is unlikely to encounter much resistance in a domestic
context.
The reality that using force can itself be a directly and immediately risky en-
deavor has, in the past, served as a brake on using it too often and for too
long. In ordinary circumstances, when a country’s military personnel are putting
their lives on the line in pursuit of a political cause, domestic concern about the
duration of a war is largely attributable to the accumulation over time of friendly
casualties. The lengthy, ground-based campaigns fought by U.S. troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq were wound up for a multiplicity of reasons, but a reluctance
to continue the shedding of American blood (in pursuit of aims that many
Americans came to believe were not worth the cost) was prominent among
them. As of June , U.S. military casualties in Afghanistan (Operation
Enduring Freedom) stood at , fatalities and , wounded. And in Iraq
(Operation Iraqi Freedom), the United States suffered , military fatalities
and , personnel wounded. Even in the case of the Kosovo intervention,
during which there were no U.S. ground troops deployed and military pilots
ﬂew at altitudes beyond the range of Serbian anti-aircraft ﬁre, President Bill
Clinton warned: “This action is not risk-free . . . . And I ask for the prayers of
all Americans for our men and women in uniform in the area.” By contrast, a
president need not invoke protective “prayers” for U.S. drone operators.
In , CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan
are “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al
Qaeda leadership.” Setting aside the question of whether a game must be a
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violent one, there are in fact alternatives to using drones: for example, using in-
habited aircraft and/or deploying ground troops. Indeed, the latter “game”
achieved the killing of Osama bin Laden himself inside Pakistan in .
Nevertheless, non-drone operations are in general far less palatable politically to
the U.S. government because they involve the exposure of U.S. personnel to phys-
ical risks. The perception that U.S. drone operators can go on killing America’s
enemies one by one, without experiencing any danger to themselves, means
there is little or no reason for the operators’ families, friends, and fellow citizens
to desire or demand the cessation of such activity. A humanistic concern for the
fate of non-Americans at the receiving end of drone strikes has caused consider-
able concern within Congress and among the public, but the administration has
sought to assuage this concern by routinely describing the use of drones as precise
and discriminate. In a live Internet forum in , for example, President Obama
said that “drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties . . . . For the
most part they have been very precise precision strikes against al Qaeda and their
afﬁliates.” Of course, establishing the exact meaning of “huge” and “the most
part” is impossible while a shroud of ofﬁcial secrecy hangs over these CIA
activities.
Later, in his May  speech, Obama sought to compare the risk to noncom-
batants resulting from terrorism on the one hand and from U.S. drone strikes on
the other: “Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death
toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian
casualties from drone strikes.” Even if this is true, however, the relevant compar-
ison when contemplating vis perpetua is between the risks experienced by those at
opposite ends of a drone strike. To compare drone strikes to terrorism, as Obama
did, is unhelpful even if it is done favorably. The salient problem from a justice
perspective is not that the principle of noncombatant immunity is (or might
be) willfully and repeatedly ignored by individual drone operators in a manner
comparable to terrorism. Rather, it is that when drone-based violence is consid-
ered at the system level, the transfer of physical risk away from U.S. combatants
and towards noncombatants in targeted territories results consistently (and, there-
fore, predictably) in indiscriminate harm. Driven by a concern to avoid the fric-
tion of domestic aversion to American casualties, drone-based violence is used
in a way that privileges national identity over noncombatant status as regards
the experiencing of physical risk. Contrary to the spirit of jus in bello
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discrimination, the lives of U.S. combatants at home are valued more highly than
the lives of noncombatants in the vicinity of a drone strike.
It is a characteristic of what Martin Shaw calls “risk-transfer militarism” that
some aerial bombing “is undertaken in the ﬁrm knowledge that it will increase
the risk to civilians compared with other possible means, military as well as non-
military.” An individual drone operator can be punctilious in upholding the dis-
crimination principle, and a drone campaign certainly has the potential—from
one air strike to the next—to be less harmful to noncombatants than a campaign
involving other forms of violence. Nevertheless, it is a deliberate and systematic
feature of drone use that a drone operator experiences no physical risk while, at
the same time, noncombatants are endangered by imperfections of technology
and human judgment. Noncombatants cannot be removed from these dangers
like a pilot can be removed from both a cockpit and a country. Whereas a
drone operator cannot be killed (qua drone operator), noncombatant deaths
from drone strikes are or could be the result of bad targeting intelligence, a me-
chanical or communication malfunction, or of simply being too close to an
air-to-surface munition. The latter danger, in particular, explodes the notion
that drone strikes are precise to a “pinpoint.” For example, Reaper aircraft
carry -pound Paveway II bombs that have been shown to yield a “lethal [to
 percent of exposed persons] blast range” of about  meters, and in general
the “recommended safe distance” (for unprotected troops) from the impact point
is  meters.
Even if, at the level of individual decision-making, intentional injustices are
ethically distinguishable from those that are merely foreseeable, such a distinction
is undermined by the systematic avoidance (by U.S. drone operators in general)
and transfer (to foreign noncombatants in general) of physical risk. When a pro-
gram of violence as a whole, working exactly as intended, consistently spares com-
batants on one side and endangers noncombatants on the other, it is difﬁcult to
describe and excuse the killing of innocents as having been merely foreseen.
Rather, such a program has the appearance, across time, of dishonoring the prin-
ciple of discrimination.
Conclusion
Can drone-based violence be restrained and regulated? The extant moral para-
digms covering war and law enforcement are arguably unhelpful because of the
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difﬁculty in conceptualizing such violence as falling neatly within either. If war is
by nature a contest, drone strikes are not war. Rather, drone technology, precisely
because it enables killing in a way that does not expose the killer to physical risk,
poses a fundamental challenge to the traditional notion of war as something mor-
ally distinguishable from other forms of violence. Moral permission is sometimes
granted for violence applied when enforcing the law, but this alternative concep-
tualization of drone strikes is also difﬁcult to sustain. Although killing can be a
ﬁnal result or an emergency response in a criminal justice process, it cannot be
the sole objective thereof. This is because the human rights norms applicable to
state-sanctioned violence in peacetime require a presumption in favor of arrest
and an intention to conduct a trial. It follows that, with war and law enforcement
so excluded at the conceptual level, the potential users and victims of drones face a
predicament in which violence is effectively unregulated because it cannot be
made subject to familiar mechanisms of accountability. Such violence is liable
to be perceived as illegitimate by default. The suggestion that jus ad vim is avail-
able—as a moral framework for “force short of war” in general and for drone
strikes speciﬁcally—does not currently appear to be a promising one, although
further theorization is warranted. For now, the force/war distinction (better
characterized as a small/large distinction) underpinning vim is conceptually
and empirically difﬁcult to sustain.
If drone-based violence cannot be governed as war, law enforcement, or vim,
this is reason enough for ethical concern, but the problem of a moral vacuum
is compounded by a further possibility. In the context of the U.S.-led war on
terror, in which the killing of individuals identiﬁed as terrorists is a form of
risk management, drone-based violence might so transcend the war/peace dichot-
omy as to be vis perpetua in nature. Ethical restraints on the use of force are given
meaning by the possibility of a subsequent and superior peace. For this reason, the
violence threshold, once crossed, should not be regarded as a point of no return.
But when remote-control killing of individuals is easily done and easy to continue,
reasons to stop might be hard to ﬁnd.
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